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ABSTRACT
Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) has become in the last years one of
the most prominent paradigms for urban sensing. In MCS systems,
citizens actively participate in the sensing process by contributing
data from their mobile devices. To make eective a MCS cam-
paign, large participation is fundamental. Users sustain costs to
contribute data and they may be reluctant in joining the sensing
process. Hence, it is essential to incentivize participants. Several
incentive mechanisms have been investigated, such as monetary
rewarding. In this context, distributed payment platforms based on
custom built blockchains assume a fundamental role. We aim to de-
velop a platform to distribute micro-payments following rewarding
schemes. The key idea is to dierentiate between users through
several parameters, such as the amount of acquired data and the
Quality of Information (QoI), according to the particular campaign
and the need of the organizers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the unprecedented growth of population living in urban
areas calls for a sustainable urban development. To this end, sens-
ing is fundamental to monitor the current status of infrastructures
and the resource utilization [1]. Deploying sensing infrastructures
is typically expensive, while including citizens in the loop through
mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has been proven as a win-win strat-
egy [2]. Indeed, it allows to exploit already deployed infrastructures
with no need of further investments. Mobility and intelligence of
human participants guarantee higher coverage and better context
awareness, if compared to traditional sensor networks. In addition,
users ensure self-maintenance and recharge of the devices that
act as sensor and communication mobile nodes, unprecedentely
from other paradigms. Smartphones are equipped with a rich set
of sensors suitable in multiple domains, such as environmental
monitoring, health care, public safety and intelligent transporta-
tion systems. Available communication technologies deliver the
acquired data to a collector, typically located in the cloud, for data
processing and analysis.
MCS follows a Sensing as a Service (S2aaS) business model, which
makes data collected from sensors available to cloud users. IoT and
MCS are key enablers in the S2aaS models, whose eciency is
dened in terms of the revenues obtained through data selling and
the costs. The success of crowdsensing campaigns relies on large
participation of citizens, who sustain costs to contribute data (e.g.,
the battery drain of their devices or monthly data plans for cellular
data connectivity). Hence, it is fundamental to devise ecient
data collection frameworks (DCFs) and to reward users for their
contribution. Consequently, the organizer of a sensing campaign
(e.g., a government agency, an academic institution or a business
corporation) sustains costs to recruit and compensate users for their
involvement [3].
Several incentive mechanisms, e.g., social or monetary, have
been and are currently under investigation. Many researchers are
challenging the issues to design practical data collection schemes
for MCS data markets [4]. Our aim is to exploit distributed pay-
ment platforms that run applications on custom built blockchains
to provide incentives in MCS campaigns, according to rewarding
schemes. The motivation is twofold. First, these platforms enable
organizers to design custom user rewarding schemes that could
dierentiate between contributions according the need of the appli-
cation, taking into account several parameters (e.g., quantity and
quality of contributed data). Second, they provide the possibility to
move funds without the need of a central authority or counterparty
risk.
2 BACKGROUND ON OUR PREVIOUS WORKS
Devising energy ecient DCFs is crucial to foster citizens’ partici-
pation. To this end, in the early-stage of our work we investigated
the costs users sustain for sensing and reporting operations and we
proposed a distributed energy ecient DCF [5]. It aims to minimize
the battery drain for sensing and reporting, while maximizing the
utility of data collection and, as a result, the quality of contributed
information. Then, we proposed a methodology to investigate the
performance of several DCFs and compare them from an energy
perspective, but also considering amount of collected data and
fairness among participants. To this end, we developed a custom
Android application for smartphones that can implement dierent
data reporting mechanisms and we performed energy and network-
related measurements with a power monitor and Wireshark. As
MCS systems require large participation to be eective, performing
experiments on real testbeds is not often feasible. To this end, sim-
ulations are a valid alternative and CrowdSenSim [6] is a custom
simulator we specically designed to assess the performance of
crowdsensing activities in large urban areas. CrowdSenSim sup-
ports pedestrian mobility in citywide scenarios and is composed
by independent modules representing inputs of the particular MCS
campaign (see Fig. 1(a)). Modeling the urban environment with
high precision is a key ingredient to obtain eective results and
CrowdSenSim provides the street network graph at any desired
level of precision (see Fig. 1(b)) through an algorithm running on its
background. All the individual walking paths are obtained before
simulation runtime to ensure the scalability of the platform. During
runtime, users move following their predetermined trajectories and
contribute data according to the implemented DCF, exploiting sen-
sors typically available in mobile devices. The simulator computes
the amount of gathered data for each user and the associated bat-
tery drain for sensing and reporting. After the runtime it is possible
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Figure 1: CrowdSenSim modules, walking paths and possible results
to obtain dierent results, such as heatmaps with the normalized
amount of gathered data (see Fig. 1(c)).
3 DISTRIBUTED PAYMENTS FOR MOBILE
CROWDSENSING
The organizers of crowdsensing campaigns (e.g., a company, a mu-
nicipality, or an academic institution) have no longer the need to
acquire an infrastructure to perform a campaign, but exploit already
deployed ones in a pay-as-you-go basis. Many researchers are inves-
tigating on several incentive mechanisms, mainly monetary ones
because they result more eective than others in fostering citizens’
participation. In this Section we will analyze user rewarding and
decentralized payment platforms that enable developers at running
smart contracts on custom built blockchains.
3.1 User rewarding
The success of a MCS campaign relies on large participation of
citizens and on their willingness to contribute data. To this end,
rewarding users is essential. Fig. 2 shows the process of user recruit-
ment, selection and rewarding in a typical crowdsensing campaign.
First, the organizer of the campaign needs to recruit participants
from citizens. Then, a central authority allocates tasks to the re-
cruited users and selects contributors amongst the group according
to policies specically designed from the organizer. In other words,
the user selection consists in choosing participants who are more
suitable for given reasons to accomplish sensing tasks. Selection
is totally dependent on context-awareness and can be based on
dierent strategies, such as spatial or temporal sensing coverage,
energy costs or technologies needed for delivering data. Finally,
selected users contribute data to the central collector, which re-
wards them according to some criteria that depend on the sensing
campaign design, such as amount of collected data and quality of
information. Research works based on monetary incentives usually
focus on nding an optimal task policy under a limited budget by
considering that each task has dierent requirements. Leveraging
the vast adoption in crowd applications of multiple sensors, current
rewarding strategies are suboptimal as fail to dierentiate between
active versus non-active user involvement, type and quality of re-
ported data. Our aim is to exploit several criteria to develop a user
rewarding scheme based on a strong dierentiation between par-
ticipants who contribute in dierent ways, compensating the most
active ones.
3.2 Decentralized platforms to distribute
payment
Rewarding users implies the need to distribute micro-payments to
them according to the criteria of each sensing campaign. Deliver
micro-payments through participants requires distributed and re-
liable platforms, which could run smart contracts to respect the
designed rewarding schemes between the parties. A smart contract
is a self-executing digital contract veried through peers, without
the need of a central authority. In this context, blockchain technol-
ogy is fundamental by providing a transparent, unalterable, ordered
ledger and by enabling a decentralized and secure environment.
Hyperledger1 is an open-source project to develop and improve
blockchain frameworks and platforms. It is based on the idea that
only collaborative software development can guarantee the inter-
operability and transparency to adopt blockchain tecnologies in
the commercial mainstream. Ethereum2 is a decentralized platform
that allows developers to distribute payments on the basis of previ-
ously chosen instructions without a counterpart risk or the need of
a middle authority. Developers have the opportunity to run applica-
tions with their rewarding rules on a custom built blockchain with
a shared global infrastructure to distribute payments. Exploiting
these platforms could allow the organizer of a sensing campaign
to decide how to reward citizens according to several parameter
previously decided on application-basis (e.g., amount of data, type
of sensor, QoI, time of reporting).
3.3 Application for rewarding citizens
Existing distributed payment platforms allow to run custom appli-
cations to move funds in accordance with instructions, representing
a perfect match with rewarding schemes for crowdsensing systems.
The key idea is to distribute payments dierentiating between cit-
izens that actively perform tasks and report highly accurate data
and others that passively perform data reporting, often resulting
in low-quality contributions. To this end, payment platforms run-
ning smart contracts could reward users according to chosen cri-
teria, which vary on dierent campaigns’ requirements. We aim
1https://www.hyperledger.org/
2https://www.ethereum.org/
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Figure 2: User selection and rewarding in MCS systems
to develop a custom application that runs on a blockchain-based
distributed payment platform, investigating how to design a re-
warding scheme that could dierentiate between users according to
their contribution. First, rewarding strategies should consider qual-
ity and quantity of contributed information. Then, a sustainable
scheme should also consider to award in a better way a user who
has a lower level of battery or will contribute for a higher energy
consuming task. Finally, available communication technologies
should be considered because typically WiFi entails lower costs
than cellular data connectivity (e.g., a user could pay for a monthly
data plan). In other words, active citizens sending a large amount
of data with a high QoI and low level of remaining battery should
be rewarded better than passive ones with full battery and sending
low-quality data.
4 RELATEDWORKS
Incentives for MCS frameworks are typically either monetary or
social. The latter include research works that focus on citizens who
express their availability to be recruited for contributing informa-
tion during a MCS campaign and establishing social interactions.
To give a few examples, Xiao et al. [7] analyze the task assign-
ment problem in mobile social networks and propose a scenario in
which users send tasks to others who accomplish the task, in order
to minimize the average makespan. Chessa et al. [8] investigate
mobility and interaction patterns between volunteers to increase
performance of MCS campaigns, exploiting existing social ties and
introducing community-based tasks to share social relationships.
The former are research works that investigate how to eciently
allocate tasks under a limited budget and how to foster user par-
ticipation with monetary rewarding in order to achieve the goals
of the sensing campaign. Zheng et al. [9] investigate the busi-
ness paradigm of data trading designing a data collection scheme
for crowdsensed data markets. They propose a framework called
VENUS, which aims to maximize the prot and minimize the pay-
ment. Xu et al. [10] propose a distributed active learning framework
that aims to minimize prediction errors under a limited amount of
budget, focusing on trade-os between inference performance and
costs of data acquisition. Chen et al. [11] present a payment scheme
which aims to maximize prot and to select qualied contributors.
To the best of our knowledge, currently there are no works that ex-
ploit existing distributed payment platforms running smart contract
based on rewarding schemes to foster user participation in MCS
systems. The closest work to our idea is [12], where the authors
investigate incentives and preservation of privacy and propose a
dual-anonymous reward distribution scheme to achieve reward-
sharing incentive and privacy protection for both customers and
contributing users. This mechanism allows a campaign organizer
to motivate user contribution by claiming electronic coins from a
bank, while protecting the identities of both sides.
5 CONCLUSION
Active citizen participation in MCS campaigns is becoming a com-
mon practice. Devising ecient DCFs and having a large partici-
pation of users is essential for the success of a campaign. In our
early-stage work, we rst proposed an energy ecient DCF which
minimizes the costs user sustain, while maximizing the utility of
collected information. Then, we developed an Android applica-
tion that can implement DCFs and we proled real energy and
network measurements exploiting a power monitor and Wireshark.
Then, these results have been included in the CrowdSenSim simu-
lator, specically designed to assess the performance in real urban
environments. Next step of our work is to exploit existing reward-
ing platforms based on custom built blockchains that run smart
contracts and develop on it a custom application to dierentiate
payments between users that actively send high-quality data and
passive low-quality contributors.
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